The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
We find yet another type of this instability of character as quite a
peculiar possession of the more recent literary output of Germany. It
is a type of character in which a kind of flatulence in emotion is
the rule no less than the source. The classic example is the Werther
of Goethe's romance, a thoroughly morbid type of character, without
any vestige of real manliness such as might carry him beyond the
egotism of his love-passion. What makes him interesting is the passion
and beauty of his emotional life, the intimate fellowship between
himself and Nature which the course of his spiritual experience and
the pliability of his temperament accentuate. This effeminacy has yet
more recently embodied itself in many other forms of expression which
descend with increasing rapidity to the lowest circle of jejune and
tasteless egotism. We must not even omit, for instance, to include
in our list that illustration of the lovely soul which we find in
Jacobi's "Woldemar." In this romance we are made a present of the
glory of emotional volubility in all its pretensions. It would be
difficult, indeed, to cite a better example of the self-deceptive
illusion of personal virtue and excellence. Here we have all that
sublimity and divinity of soul, which relates itself crookedly to every
possible aspect of the actual world; that type of feebleness which is
wholly unable to share in or tolerate any portion of the labours or
interests of practical life as it really is. So rooted is it in its
own consciousness of superiority it passes everything as unworthy of
it on the other side. It is, in fact, a peculiar feature of this type
of "lovely soul" that, even when face to face with the truly ethical
interests and wholly sane objects of life, instead of meeting them
frankly, it retires into the seclusion of itself, where it weaves its
own threads of finery and passes its time in hatching out its exquisite
brood of religious and moral reflections. And connected closely with
this personal enthusiasm for our superabundant excellence, which we set
forth in front of ourselves with such a brave show, there will always
be an intense sensitiveness for all other beings who may appear at any
moment to sympathize with, comprehend, and appreciate this beauty of
the solitary life. If such fellow-feeling is not forthcoming we find
the very heart of us troubled to its depths and infinitely bruised.
We have lost at one stroke all humanity, friendship, and love. We are
unable to put away with whatever act of pedantry or rudeness may be in
question, some trivial circumstance or stupidity over which the vision
of any character of breadth or strength would pass without a tremor. It
whirls away the thought of everything else, and that which is by itself
of least significance proves to be that which finally most reduces us
to despair. Such is the source of all that endless train of melancholy,
trouble, heartache, peevishness, sickness, dejection, and poverty