The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
of spirit which follows, such the spring of all those self-torturing
reflections one on the top of another, that cramp and obstinacy, nay,
finally, that cruelty of soul, through which the wretchedness and
weakness of the spiritual content of such a type, of "loveliness"
consummates and declares itself. No heart that is truly sound can
wish to unite itself with such an emotional hermitage. For it is a
fundamental characteristic of all genuine character that it carries
within itself both the courage and the strength to do and to will some
actual thing. The interest, therefore, that such natures which are for
ever revolving round themselves may arouse in us is after all an empty
interest, and necessarily so despite all the conviction with which such
natures may assure us that they belong to a higher and purer sphere
than our own, a sphere which has revealed to our vision that peculiar
type of the Divine they have uncovered from their secret parts and
finally present to us, to borrow an apt figure, _en negligée._
This want of genuine solidity of character appears in yet another form
where we find the particular manifestations of this world of "fine
feelings" turned as it were upside down and hypostatized as independent
forces. Much that passes for magic, magnetism, spiritualism, the
apparitions of _clairvoyance_, the morbid condition of sleep-walking,
is attributable to this source. The living person in question is
placed in a relation to these abstruse powers, which from one point
of view identifies him with them, and in another makes them appear as
something foreign to his spiritual life, which determines and controls
it. It is assumed that underlying these undefined forces there is some
inexplicable truth which borders on the marvellous, or at any rate
passes comprehension. From the world of art, however, all such powers
of darkness should be banished. In art there is no darkness at all, but
all is lucid and transparent, and in adventuring after such types of
myopy speech merely flounders into spiritual disease, or plays loose as
poetry with the nebulous, empty, and trivial, a good example of which
is the verse of Hoffmann, and that piece by Henry von Klust entitled
the "Prince of Homburg." The truly ideal character has nothing in his
composition, or the pathos which expresses it, of another world and its
ghosts, but only actual interests, in which he finds himself at home.
More particularly is this feature of _clairvoyance_ become a trivial
and vulgar recipe of our more modern poets. In Schiller's "Tell," on
the contrary, when the old Attinghausen on the brink of the grave
foretells the destiny of his country, the prophetic instinct is quite
in its right place. It is always, however, a misfortune for an artist
to find himself forced to exchange the sanity of a character with some
malady of the soul whether it be to motive the collision or excite
interest. For this reason he should only avail himself of the condition