The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
If we look more closely at what this dictum implies we have again once
more two aspects, that is to say a content or subject matter, and the
mode of its presentation. In our consideration of a work of art we
begin with that which is directly presented to us, and after seeing
it we proceed to inquire what its significance or content is. That
external husk possesses no value to us simply as such. We assume that
there is an inward, an ideality or a significance behind it, in virtue
of which the external appearance is made alive with mind or spirit. It
is to this, its soul, that the external appearance points and attests.
For an appearance which is significant of something does not present
itself to us, and merely that which it is _quâ_ externality, but
something other than this; as also does the symbol for example and with
yet more clarity the fable, the significance of which is simply the
moral and teaching of the same. In fact there is no word which does not
point to a meaning, possessing no value by itself. In the same way the
human eye, the face, flesh, skin, the entire presence are a revelation
of spirit, intelligence and soul; and in such a case the significance
is without exception something beyond that which is offered in
the bare appearance. In this way too the work of art must possess
significance; it must not appear to have told its tale simply in the
fact of particular lines, curves, surfaces, indentations, reliefs of
stone-work, in particular colours, tones, sounds of words, whatever
medium in fact art may employ. Its function is to unveil an inward or
ideal vitality, emotion, soul, a content and mind, which is precisely
what we mean by the significance of a work of art.
This demand, therefore, for significance in a work of art is to all
intents, and in its embrace much the same thing as Hirt's principle of
the characteristic.
According to this conception we find as characteristic constituents
of the beautiful an inward somewhat, a content, and an external rind
which possesses that content as its significance. The inner or ideal
constituent appears in the external and thus enables itself to be
recognized, that which is external pointing away from itself to the
inward.
We cannot, however, pursue the matter here into further detail.