The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
1. With regard to the first point, that a work of art is a product of
human activity, an inference has been drawn from this (_a_) that such
an activity, being the conscious production of an external object can
also be _known_ and _divulged_, and learned and reproduced by others.
For that which one is able to effect, another--such is the notion--is
able to effect or to imitate[41], when he has once simply mastered the
way of doing it. In short we have merely to assume an acquaintance with
the rules of art-production universally shared, and anybody may then,
if he cares to do so, give effect to executive ability of the same
type, and produce works of art. It is out of reasoning of this kind
that the above-mentioned theories, with their provision of rules, and
their prescriptions formulated for practical acceptance, have arisen.
Unfortunately that which is capable of being brought into effect in
accordance with suggestions of this description can only be something
formally regular and mechanical. For only that which is mechanical is
of so exterior a type that only an entirely empty effort of will and
dexterity is required to accept it among our working conceptions, and
forthwith to carry it out; an effort, in fact, which is not under the
necessity to contribute out of its own resources anything concrete such
as is quite outside the prescriptive power of such general rules.
This is apparent with most vividness when precepts of this kind are not
limited to what is purely external and mechanical, but extend their
pretensions to the activity of the artist in the sense that implies
wealth of significance and intelligence. In this field our rules pass
off to purely indefinite generalities, such as "the theme ought to be
interesting, and each individual person must speak as is appropriate
to his status, age, sex and situation." But if rules are really to
suffice for such a purpose their directions ought to be formulated
with such directness of detail that, without any further co-operation
of mind, they could be executed precisely in the manner they are
prescribed. Such rules being, in respect to this content, abstract,
clearly and entirely fall short of their pretension of being able to
complete[42] the artistic consciousness. Artistic production is not a
formal activity in accordance with a series of definitions; it is, as
an activity of soul, constrained to work out of its own wealth, and
to bring before the mind's eye a wholly other and far richer content,
and a more embracing and unique[43] creation than ever can be thus
prescribed. In particular cases such rules may prove, of assistance,
in so far, that is, as they contain something really definite and
consequently useful for practice. But even here their guidance will
only apply to conditions wholly external.