The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
The _third_ sphere of content attached to the riddle and the allegory
consists in the _imaged thing_ generally. The riddle veiled the still
independently cognized significance and the mode of its shaping in
cognate, albeit heterogeneous and distantly placed traits of definition
was still of most importance. Allegory on the contrary emphasized
the perspicuity of the significance so strongly as the predominant
aim, that the personification and its attributes appear deposed to
the rank of mere signs. The imaged thing now connects this clarity of
allegorical expression with that impulse of the riddle to envisage the
significance which stands out clearly before the mind in the form of an
externality cognate with it; the result, however, is not that it gives
rise to problems which have first of all to be solved, but rather that
the imaged shape appears, by means of which the preconceived conception
is revealed with absolute transparency, notifying itself as that which
it really is.
(_a_) _The Metaphor_
The _first_ point we have to draw attention to in the _metaphor_ is
this, that it may be accepted at once as essentially a simile, in so
far as it expresses clear and self-subsistent significance in a similar
phenomenon of reality comparable with it. In the comparison as such,
however, both sides of the comparison, that is the real meaning and
the image, are definitely kept apart from each other, while on the
contrary in the metaphor this separation, albeit it is essentially
present, is _not_ as yet clearly _posited._ For this reason Aristotle
long ago distinguished comparison and metaphor by his statement that
a "how" is added to the former which is absent from the latter. In
other words the metaphorical expression specifies but _one_ aspect,
the image. In the context, however, to which the image is attached,
the real significance which is intended lies so near that it is at
the same time immediately asserted without any direct separation of
it from the image. When it is said, for example: "the Spring-time
of these cheeks," or "a sea of tears," we are inevitably forced to
accept such an expression as an image rather than an actual fact,
an image whose significance the context at the same time expressly
designates. In the symbol and allegory the relation of actual meaning
to external form is not asserted either so immediately or necessarily.
From the fact that an Egyptian staircase consists of nine stages,
and a hundred other circumstances of similar pregnancy, it is only
the adept, the connoisseur, and the professor who will derive a
symbolical significance, and doubtless will scent out and discover
much that is both mystical and symbolical into the bargain, which is
so much ingenuity of research thrown away for the reason that what is
discovered is not there. This may have happened often enough to my
honoured friend Creutzer, no less than our latter-day Platonists and
the commentators of Dante.