The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
its external form, is expressly stated, and we learn by this means the
exact relation which exists between them. In that case, however, the
concrete fact which is set before us ceases to be a symbol in the real
meaning of the term, and becomes simply an image, the relation of which
to significance is expressed by the well-known form of comparison,
namely, _simile._ In the simile, that is to say, both factors are
immediately presented to us, the general conception and its concrete
image. When on the contrary reflection has not proceeded so far as to
hold general conceptions in assured independence, and consequently to
set them forth by themselves, in that case we find that the sensuous
image to which they are cognate, and in which a significance of more
general[11] import is able to find its expression is not yet conceived
as separate from such a significance, but both are still immediately
held together in unity. And this it is which, as we shall see more
closely as we proceed, constitutes the distinction between symbol
and comparison. An illustration of the latter kind may be found in
that exclamation of Karl Moor, as he gazes on the setting sun: "Thus
dies a hero!" Here we see that the ideal significance is expressly
separated from the sensuous impression while at the same time it is
associated with the picture. In other cases, it is true even of similes
this act of separation in relation is not so clearly marked, and the
association appears to be more immediate; in such cases it must already
appear manifest from the general content of the narrative, from the
position assigned to the picture, or other circumstances, that viewed
as merely a statement of fact, such an image is not justified, but that
some special significance or other, which cannot fail to arrest our
attention, is intended by it. When, for example, Luther says:
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A steadfast stronghold is our God.
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or we read:
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In den Ocean schifft mit tausend Masten der Jungling,
Still auf geretteten Boot treibt in den Hafen der Greis[12].
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we can have no doubt whatever upon the implied significance, whether
it be of a protection suggested by "stronghold," the world of hopes
and life-plans symbolized in the picture of the ocean and the thousand
masts; or the narrowed aims and possessions with the assured plot of
ground at the end, which is reflected from the boat and the haven. In
the same way when we read in the Old Testament: "May God break their
teeth in their mouth, may the Lord shatter the hindermost teeth of the
young lions," it is obvious that neither the words "mouth," "teeth,"
nor "hindermost teeth of the young lions" are used in the literal
sense, but are utilized as images and sensuous ideas, which carry a
significance only present to the mind, and that such _significance_ is
all that matters.