The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_α_) The signs by means of which the gods thus made their revelations
are for the most part of the simplest description. At Dodona such
were the rustle and whisper of the sacred oak, the murmur of the
spring, the tones of the brazen vessel, which the wind made thus to
reverberate. In like manner at Delos it was the laurel which rustled
and at Delphi, too, the sound of the wind on the brazen tripod was full
of significance[156]. Over and above, however, such immediately natural
sounds man is also the voice-piece of the oracle in so far as he is
rendered deaf to and whirled away from the alert commonsense of his
ordinary mind to a natural condition of enthusiasm; as, for example,
the Pythia at Delphi was wont, stupefied by exhalations, to deliver
the oracular words, or in the cave of Trophonius the inquirer of the
oracle met with faces, from the interpretation of which an answer was
delivered him.
(_β_) There is, however, another aspect which we should set alongside
of the purely external sign. For in the oracles God is, it is true,
accepted as He who _knows_, and the oracle of most famed repute is
dedicate to Apollo, the god of wisdom. The form, however, in which he
reveals his will, remains the wholly indefinite voice of Nature, either
a natural sound, that is, or the unconnected tones of words. In this
obscurity of form the spiritual content is itself equally obscure and
requires _interpretation_ and explanation.
(_γ_) This explanation, albeit it brings under a mode of spiritual life
the deliverance of the god which in the first instance is presented
purely in the form of Nature's own voice, remains despite this fact
obscure and equivocal. For the god is in his knowledge and volition
concrete universality. And of the same type also must the advice or
command unavoidably be which the oracle declares. The universal,
however, is not one-sided and abstract, but as concrete universal
contains the one side no less than the other. Inasmuch, then, as
man stands over against the knowing god as one unknowing he accepts
the oracular word itself in ignorance. In other words, the concrete
universality of the same is not open to his intelligence, and he can
merely select from the equivocal word of the god, assuming that he
decides to act upon it, _one_ aspect thereof, for the reason that
every action under particular circumstances is unavoidably _definite_,
only, that is to say, giving a decisive impulse in _one_ direction
and shutting off another. His action is barely accomplished, and the
deed--which consequently has become his own and for which he must
now be answerable--really carried through when he finds a collision
confronting him. All in a moment he is aware that the other side, which
lay already folded in the oracular sentence, is turned against himself
and the fatality of his deed, his knowledge and will notwithstanding,
has him in the toils; a fatality which he may not know, but of which
we must suppose the gods are aware.