The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_γγ_) Inasmuch as, further, the god passes into the sphere of the
human imagination, and, still more important, is represented in real
bodily shape, into close relations with which again man is placed by
his _cultus_ in the activities of divine worship, a fresh material is
here, too, presented by such relations for the extension of all that
is positive and accidental. What animals have to be sacrificed to any
god, what vestments the priesthood or the worshipper must appear in,
what particular sequence must be adopted in any ceremonial--by all such
matters the most varied and particular incidents are accumulated. For
every activity of this kind implies an indefinite number of aspects and
modes of arrangement, which may accidentally fall out in this way or
that, but which, as appurtenant to a sacred rite, should be something
settled, and not fixed by caprice, and which necessarily tend to
pass into the sphere of symbolism. The colour of the vestments is an
example of this; in the ritual of Bacchus we have the colour of wine,
in like manner the doe-skin in which those initiated in the mysteries
were enwrapped. The same thing applies to the drapery and attributes
of the gods, the bow of Pythian Apollo, the whip, the staff, and
numberless other accessories. Such things become, however, gradually
a custom and nothing more; no one in the practice of the same thinks
any longer of their birth history; and all that we now by dint of
our research point out as their significance, has in the performance
of them grown to something quite external, which mankind associates
himself with on account of the immediate interest, that is, from mere
sense of fun, delight in the present, devotion, or simply because it
is just a custom and is so fixed for his active senses, and is done
in like manner by others. As an example from our own life, when we
see our German youth light the Johannis fire in summer time, or play
antics elsewhere, and throw it at the windows, such is for us a purely
formal custom, in which the original significance fades as much into
the background as at the festal dances of Greek youths and maidens
the revolutions of the dance do in their imitative (like the twists
and turns of some labyrinth) significance of the spiral motions of
the planets. Youth does not dance in order to entertain ideas of such
things, but the interest limits itself naturally to the dancing and the
tasteful and graceful festivity of its beautiful motion. The entire
significance, which was created by the original stimulus, and of which
the reproduction was for the imagination and sensuous perception of
symbolical character, is throughout an imaginative conception, whose
singular traits we suffer to pass from us like a fairy story, or as in
historical narrative as external detail relative to Time and Space,
and of which we can only say: "It is so," or, "Such is the tale," and
so forth. The interest of art can consequently only consist in this,