The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
such an ecstasy as may reflect the surrender and victory over pain,
the fruition, in short, of the Divine Presence in the temple of the
soul. If, on the contrary, the art of sculpture seeks to give a visible
form to such a content, it will inevitably find itself less qualified
to depict this ecstasy of soul-life at this strain of its intensity
with such a concentrated power, and will consequently be compelled to
emphasize that aspect of pain and laceration in so far as it declares
itself in its full force on the bodily frame.
(_γ_) _Thirdly_, it is to be observed that in the kind of examples
with which we are now dealing it is not merely the existence of Nature
and immediate finite conditions which is affected by this attitude
of self-abnegation and endurance, but the impulse of the soul is
transported by such feelings to an extreme point of this heavenly
rapture to such an extent, in fact, that what is merely human and of
the world, even when it is essentially beyond reproach on ethical or
rational grounds, is none the less thrust behind and scorned. In other
words, just in proportion as the Spirit, which here makes vivid to
itself the idea of its conversion, is in the first instance deficient
in an educated sense, to that extent it will with so much the more
uncontrollable and logical frenzy--the entire force of its piety being
concentrated on this one object--turn its back on everything which
as finite opposes this bare and abstract infinitude of its religious
fanaticism, that is to say, on every definite human emotion, all
the manifold ethical impulses, relations, and obligations of the
heart. For the moral life of the family, the bonds of friendship, of
blood, of love, of the State, and a man's calling, every one of them
belong to the things of the world; and all that is of the world, in
so far as it is not as yet suffused with the absolute conceptions of
faith and developed in unity and harmony with the same, appears to
this form of abstract spiritual intensity of the soul of faith so
far from being something acceptable to its emotional life and sense
of obligation, that it is, on the contrary, a thing of no worth at
all, and therefore both hostile and hurtful to its religious state.
The moral organism of the human world is consequently not as yet
respected, because its significant features and duties are not as
yet recognized as necessary, integrated members in the concatenation
of an essentially rational reality, in which nothing, it is true,
ought to assert itself in a one-sided and independent isolation, yet,
none the less, as an essential factor in the organic process, must
be maintained as such and not be sacrificed. In this respect the
religious reconciliation remains itself _one-sided_, and declares
itself in the truly simple heart as an intensity of belief which
is deficient in comprehensiveness, that is, as the piety of the
self-secluded soul, which has not yet attained in its growth to the