The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
fully expanded self-reliance of maturity, and to conviction based on
genuine insight and circumspection. When the force of a soul deficient
in these qualities maintains its opposition to the world which is
thus treated in a purely negative way, and forcefully breaks loose
from all human ties, even though they may originally be the very
closest, we can only characterize such conduct as the rawness of Spirit
and a barbaric result of the power of abstraction, which is simply
repulsive. So we may say that though from the point of view of the
religious consciousness, as we find it to-day, it is indeed possible
to honour, and to honour highly, this opening germ of religiosity in
such representations, if, however, such a pious tendency proceeds to
such lengths that we find it advancing to lay siege to what is both
essentially rational and moral, then, so far from sympathizing with
such a fanaticism of sanctity, we can only protest that a kind of
abnegation such as this, which casts off from itself, shatters and
treads upon that which is independently justifiable, and even sacred,
appears to us both immoral in itself and subversive of the very type
of religion it represents. There are many legends, tales, and poems
which deal with this extreme form of the pious craze. We have, for
example, the tale of a man who, though full of tenderness for his wife
and family, and, moreover, beloved by all his friends, leaves his home
and makes a pilgrimage. When at last he returns home in the guise of
a beggar he refuses to disclose his identity. Alms are given him,
and out of compassion a permanent lodging provided under the stairs.
In this plight he lives for twenty years; he sees the grief of his
family on his account, and only declares who he is on his death-bed.
This kind of thing, which we are asked to revere as sanctity, is, of
course, merely the egotism of a fanatic which revolts us. This long
endurance of renunciation may remind us of the distrait nature of
those penances, which the Hindoos voluntarily impose on themselves
on religious grounds. But the endurance of the Hindoo has a very
different significance. In that case a man deliberately places himself
in a condition of vacuum and unconsciousness; in the case which we
are now considering the _pain_, and the deliberate consciousness and
feeling of the same is the real object, which it is assumed will be
attained with just so much more purity as the suffering is associated
with the consciousness of the value of and devotion to the severities
which are accepted, and is, moreover, united with a vision for ever
concentrated on the renunciation thus made. The richer the heart which
takes on itself the burden of such ordeals, the nobler the content
of its own possessions, and yet withal believes that it is bound to
condemn them as of no merit, just so much the more difficult grows the
task of reconciliation, and the more prone it is to bring about the
most terrible convulsions and the most raving distraction.