The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
sinner,[240] for her exquisitely sensitive beauty only leaves us the
impression that in her love she is both noble and profound.
(_c_) _Miracles and Legends_
The final aspect, which is closely associated with the two above
considered, and is frequently asserted as a concomitant of both, is
that of miracle. It plays in fact an important part throughout this
stage of our inquiry. In this connection we may define miracle as the
conversion-history of the immediate existence of Nature. Such reality
lies before us as a commonplace, contingent existence. This finite
substance is touched by the hand of God, which, in so far as it strikes
upon what is purely external and particular, breaks it up, transmutes
it into something entirely different, interrupting what in ordinary
parlance we call the natural course of things. To bring before us the
soul arrested by such inexplicable phenomena, in which it imagines it
recognizes the presence of the Divine, vanquished, in short, in its
ordinary view of finite events, this is the main subject-matter of
a host of legends. In fact, however, the Divine can only touch and
dominate Nature as Reason, that is, in the unalterable laws of Nature
herself, as implanted therein by God, and the Divine has no occasion
to exploit Himself in the supreme sense of this term in particular
circumstances and modes of causation which run contrary to these
laws of Nature, for it is only the eternal laws and determinations
of reason which apply in any real sense to Nature. From another
point of view legends frequently carry with them quite unnecessarily
an amount of matter which is abstruse, out of taste, senseless, and
ridiculous, inasmuch as the intention is that both intellect and heart
should be stimulated to believe in the presence and activity of God
by precisely those things which are essentially irrational, false,
and heathenish. The consequent emotion, piety, and conversion of the
soul may even then awake our interest, but in that case it is only
on the _one_ side, namely, that of the soul: so soon as that enters
into relation with somewhat else outside it, and the idea is that this
external correlative shall effect the conversion of the heart, then we
inevitably require that such should not be wholly a meaningless and
irrational sequence of events.