The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
It were possible to apprehend the above relation in such a way as
though the significance were that point from which the artistic
consciousness starts on its journey, and that only after having found
this it begins to look round for means to express its universal
conceptions through external phenomena cognate in their affinity to
such conceptions. This, however, is not the way that real symbolic
art proceeds. For its characteristic distinction consists in this,
that its penetration fails as yet to grasp the significances in their
independent consistency, independent, that is, from every mode of
externality. For this reason its point of departure is rather from
that which is immediately presented and its concrete existence in
Nature and Spirit. This it thereupon, in the first instance, expands
to the measure of the universality of such significances, whose
determination such objective real existence contains only under more
restricted conditions, adding this wider range in order that it may
create a form from Spirit, which is to make that universality visible
to consciousness in this particular reality when once it is set forth
clearly before perception. Regarded as symbolical forms, therefore,
the images of art have not as yet attained a form truly adequate
to Spirit, inasmuch as Spirit itself is not as yet at this stage
essentially clear and thereby free Spirit; but we have at least here
embodiments, which essentially proclaim the fact to us, that they are
not merely selected to represent simply themselves, but are intended to
point to significances of profounder intension and more--comprehensive
range. That which is purely natural and sensuous asserts itself as fact
and nothing beside; the symbolical work of art, however, whether it
be the phenomena of Nature or the human figure that it makes visible
to the eye, points at the same time over and outside such facts to
something further, which, however, must possess an intimate root of
affinity with the images that are thus displayed, and an essential bond
of relation with them. This association between the concrete form and
its universal significance may conceivably be present in many different
ways. At one time the emphasis will be laid on the external aspect, and
it will consequently be more obscure; at another, however, the basis of
affinity will be more pronounced as in the case when the universality,
which is to be symbolized, constitutes, in fact, the essential content
of the concrete phenomenon. In this case naturally it is a much simpler
matter to grasp the symbolic character of the object.