The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
It is an ideal significance
of this kind that the art of painting accepts as its object. And for
this reason it is not natural objects merely as such in their external
form and association which ought to constitute its true content, so
that painting is nothing more than a mere imitation, but rather the
animation of Nature's life, which interfuses it throughout and which
is able to bring into prominence and assert with more vividness in the
scenes of Nature reproduced the characteristic affinity of specific
conditions of this life with particular spiritual states--it is a vital
participation in Nature of this kind which gives us the meeting-point,
steeped as it is in the soul-life and temperament of the artist, by
means of which Nature may become the content of painting not merely as
environment, but as possessing a distinct individuality[274].
(_γ_) There is yet further a _third_ type of idealization which we find
partly in the case where objects wholly insignificant are detached from
the position they occupy in the landscape, and, partly, in scenes of
human life, which may appear to us not merely as wholly accidental as
thus selected, but even of a kind that is both mean and commonplace.
I have already found an opportunity for an attempt to justify the
artistic selection of such subjects[275]. I will in connection with
painting merely add the following remarks to our former discussion.
The art of painting is not merely concerned with the inward life
of the soul, but with that ideal element that is essentially
_particularized_[276]. This latter type of ideality for the reason
that particularity is its principle is not content to rest satisfied
with the absolute object of religion, and as little will merely accept
from the external world Nature's vitality and its defined character
as landscape; rather it insists on partaking of everything, in which
man as an isolated individual soul can take a rational interest and
find pleasure. Even in the case of its representations of religious
material art, in proportion as it develops, it attaches such more
closely to terrestrial conditions and the objects of actual vision,
giving to its content the complete presence of natural existence, so
that we ultimately find that the aspect of sensuous existence is most
important and the interest of devotional life only so in a subordinate
degree. For here, too, art receives the task to work out the Ideal in
its fullest realization, in other words, to present to our senses that
which is originally detached from them, to carry over objects taken
from the remoteness of past life into present life and unite them with
that present human life.
At our present stage of human evolution it is the ideality which we
find in actual life as it faces us, in the circumstances of daily
experience, the most common and the most trivial, which is the actual
content.