The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_αα_) If we inquire, then, what it is that makes a content of this
kind, otherwise so poverty-stricken and indifferent, compatible with
the claims of art, we must reply that it is the substantive core that
is contained and made valid therein, in general terms the vitality and
delight of self-subsistent existence, exemplified in the greatest
variety of its aims and interests. The life of mankind is always in
the immediate Present. What a man may do in each moment thereof is
something specific, and its justification consists in the fact that
he carries through all his engagements, the least no less than the
greatest, with heart and soul. In this way he is united with each
particular incident, and, by infusing into each the entire force of
his individuality, appears to identify his whole existence with such.
This coalescence[277] produces that harmony of the individual with
the specific character of his immediate activity in the circumstances
that are nearest him, which is itself a mode of ideality, and which
communicates in such a case to the subsistency of an existence, which
is an exclusive and perfected whole, its attractive character. The
interest, therefore, that we derive from representations of this kind
is not to be attributed to the subject-matter, but rather to this
animating soul, which by itself, and independently of that wherein
it is disclosed as vital, finds an echo in every uncorrupted nature,
in every free spirit, and is for the same an object of sympathy and
delight. We must not, therefore, impair our enjoyment on the ground
that the demand is made of us to admire such works of art under the
aspect of their _likeness_ to _Nature_ so-called and such illusive
imitation[278]. This demand, which works of this kind appear at first
blush to support, is itself merely a deception which fails to hit the
real point. For an admiration of this type is solely deducible from
the wholly external comparison of a work of art and a work of Nature,
and is only associated with the similarity of the counterfeit with an
object or fact presented us, whereas the real content here and the
artistic quality in the composition and execution is the coalescence
of the matter portrayed _with its own substance_, which is the reality
as independently depicted in its vital characterization. According to
the principle of illusion, for instance, the portraits of Denner are
entitled to our praise, which are, no doubt, imitations of Nature, but
for the most part fail entirely to present us that vital animation on
which we lay the main stress in these cases, and are mainly concerned
with depicting hair, wrinkles, and generally every kind of trait which,
without exactly being indicative of a corpse, are equally remote from
the human physiognomy depicted as alive.