The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Moreover, if we permit ourselves to level down our enjoyment through
superficial thoughts of the above fashionable kind, believing subjects
of this type to be mean and unworthy of our contemplation, we accept
the content by doing so in a form other than that in which art offers
them us. In other words we merely associate with them the relation
in which we stand to them according to our personal needs, pleasure,
such education as we otherwise possess and other objects we have
before us, that is to say we merely conceive them in respect to their
_external purport_, throughout which it is our own requirements which
are the vital thing we aim at for ourselves, and the matter of all
importance. The life of the subject-matter itself, however, is thereby
destroyed, in so far, that is, as the sole object of its existence
appears to be that of a means simply, or lapses into a thing of no
moment at all, just because we personally have no need for it. A gleam
of sunlight, for example, which falls upon a room we enter through
an open door, a part of the country we travel through, a sempstress,
a maid we happen to see busily engaged, one and all we may regard
with indifference, because we suffer them to pass by remote from the
thoughts and interests which are bound up with them, and consequently
in our soliloquy, or conversation with another will not suffer the
situations which actually lie before us to speak a word in the current
of our own thoughts and speech; or we cast what is merely a passing
glance at them, the summary of which does not amount to more than the
remark, "how pleasant, fine, or ugly they are." Thus we are charmed
with the joviality of dance of peasants, while we merely glance at
it superficially, or turn away from it with contempt, because we are
hostile to "every sort of barbarism." We treat in a similar way the
human countenances we come across in our daily life, or which we
happen to chance upon. Our own personal point of view, and the various
matters which engage us are for ever being interposed. _We_ are forced
to address this or that person in a certain way, we have affairs to
despatch, we have certain things to consider, thoughts that affect
our relation to such a person; we observe him under the particular
circumstances of our knowledge; we regulate our conversation relatively
to that, or we are silent upon it, if he may be likely to resent
it--in short we have always in our minds the man's business, station,
and status, and our attitude to and business with him, remaining in
a wholly practical relation, or in a position of indifference and
preoccupied inattention. Art, however, when it depicts such real
life, wholly changes our attitude to it; it cuts away once and for
all all practical deviations[279], such as we are wont to associate
with such material; it places us simply in the attitude of abstract
contemplation to it; and in the like degree it does away with its