The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
beginnings are not substantiated by history, and yet they do not aim at
making the manner of origin intelligible directly as a process involved
in the _notion_, but purport to confine their explanation to the field
of objective history.
DIVISION OF SUBJECT
We have, then, in such a way to establish the beginning of art from its
notional significance, that the first problem of art is made to consist
in giving form to that which is essentially objective, the ground, that
is, of Nature, the external environment, and by doing so to make that
which is without ideal import to conform both to significance and form,
both of which still remain external to it, for the reason that they are
not either the form or significance inherent in the objective material.
The art, which has set before it this task is, as we have seen, an
architecture which has already discovered its first elaboration under
the modes of sculpture, or painting and music[31].
If we now direct our attention to the most primitive origins of the art
of building, we find at the earliest stage that we can accept for such
a beginning the hut, regarded as the human dwelling, and the temple,
as the exterior enclosure of the god and his community. With a view
to define this commencement more closely a dispute has been raised
with reference to the nature of the _material_ employed for building,
whether, that is to say, it originated in buildings of wood, which
is the opinion of Vitruvius, and is supported by Hirt in a similar
reference, or rather from those of stone. This contrast of original
material is no doubt of importance, for it does not merely concern its
external quality as one might at first sight suppose, but rather the
architectonic character of fundamental forms; for instance, the kind of
decoration united with it is essentially bound up with this external
material. We may, however, entirely set aside the distinction as a
purely subordinate aspect of the matter rather referable to what is
accidental and empirical, and devote our attention to a point of more
importance.