The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
What mankind requires in its external life, house and farm, tent,
settle, bed, sword, lance, the ship, in which he crosses the sea, the
chariot, which bears him into battle, his soup, his roast of meat, and
drink--not one of these things need perforce become to him a lifeless
instrument; he ought still to communicate to the same something of his
entire life and substance, his essential self, and thereby leave the
stamp of his own human individuality, by his active association on that
which is otherwise wholly external. Our present life with its machinery
and factory-made products, no less than the kind of way we seek to
satisfy generally the needs of our external life, is in this respect
quite as much as that of our political organization, wholly unfit to
form the background which the Epos in its primitive guise demands. For
just as the scientific faculty with its generalizations, its imperious
conclusions, delivered independently of all personal views, can never
have asserted its claim under the world-condition of the poetic type
we are considering, so, too, we may assume that man did not yet appear
divested of his vital connection with Nature, and the fresh and
vigorous comradeship, whether as friends or opponents, which is therein
implied.
(_γγ_) Such is the world-condition which, in a previous passage, and
in contrast to the idyllic, I have called the _heroic._ We find it
depicted in Homer with the noblest poetry, and with all the wealth
of entirely human characterization. We have no more here, whether in
domestic or public life, a barbarous state of things, than we have
the wholly conventional prose of a regulated family and political
organization; what we do find is that primitive mean of poetry much
as I have already described it. A fundamental feature in such a
condition is unquestionably the free individuality of all the principal
personages. In the Iliad, for example, Agamemnon is, no doubt, a
king of kings--all other chieftains are subject to his sceptre--but
his superiority is no merely formal mutual relation of command and
submission of the lord, that is, to his vassals. On the contrary,
much circumspection is required of him; he must be shrewd enough
to know where he ought to give way, for each particular chieftain
is independent even as himself; they are not merely governors or
generals summoned by him. They have assembled around him of their
own free will, or are induced to follow his lead in a variety of
ways. He must take counsel with them; and if they disagree with his
judgment they are at liberty, as Achilles did, to remain aloof from
the battle. It is this freedom of acceptance, no less than this free
right to assert disapproval, which secures the absolute independence
of such individuality, and attaches its poetical atmosphere to every
situation. We find much the same thing in the poetry of Ossian, as also
in the relation of the Cid to the princes, whom this poetical hero of