The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_αα_) This purposed object, which is infused with the vital principle
of individuality on the lines of which, regarded in its particularized
content, the entire process moves forward, must further, as already
ascertained, appropriate to itself in the Epos the form of an _event_.
It will be therefore above all important to recall at once the specific
character of the mode, under which human volition and action generally
combine in what we designate as the event. Now, in the _first_ place,
action and adventure are the outcome of conscious life, the content
of which is not only ideally expressed in emotions, reflections, and
thoughts, but also quite as much in a practical way. We may regard
such realization from two distinct points of view. _First,_ we have
the ideal substance of the end presupposed and purposed, the general
character of which the individual must recognize, will, calculate and
accept. _Secondly_, there is the external reality of the spiritual or
human and the natural environment, within which he is only able to
act, and the accidental features of which at one time obstruct and at
another assist his path; so that either in the one case he is carried
forward by virtue of this favour to a successful issue, or, if in
the other he is not prepared wholly to give way to such opposition,
he finds it necessary to overcome them with his individual energy.
If now the world covered by this volitional power is conceived as
the indivisible unity of these two aspects, with the result that the
right of assertion by both is equally asserted, in that case what
is most pertinent to conscious life likewise enters into the formal
structure of the event, the form, that is, which confers on all human
action the _configuration of events_, in so far as the conscious or
subjective will, with its purposes, motives of passion, principles
and aims, can no longer appear the fact of most importance. Or, in
other words, in human _action_ everything is referred back to human
personality, personal obligation, opinion and intention. In the case of
the _event_, on the contrary, the external constitution of things is
permitted to assert its inviolable claim. Here it is objective reality
itself, which constitutes either the form assumed by the whole, or from
another point of view a fundamental part of the content. In agreement
with such a view I have already stated that it is the function of epic
poetry to demonstrate the _happening_ of an action, and thereby not
only to establish the external disposition of the execution of ends,
but also to meet as readily the claims of external condition, natural
occurrences, and all else of a contingent character, which, in action
taken simply as such, the ideal element of conscious life claims
exclusively as its province.