The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
With yet more force will this artificial _compôte_ of the poet appear
as such rather than a work that springs naturally from the subject
where we are already cognisant of the substance of the tale that
is told us in its fresh and primitive form, or as actual history.
Examples of this are Milton's "Paradise Lost," the "Noachid" of
Bodmer, Klopstock's "Messias," Voltaire's "Henriade," and others. In
all these poems we cannot fail to detect a real cleft between the
content and the reflection of the poet which modifies his description
of the events, characters and circumstances. In Milton's case, for
example, we find emotions and observations obviously the growth of an
imagination and ethical ideas inseparable from his own age. In the
same way with Klopstock we have God the Father, the history of Jesus
Christ, patriarchs and angels combined with our German education of
the eighteenth century, and the ideas of Wölffian metaphysic. This
twofold aspect asserts itself in every line. No doubt in these cases
the content itself offers many difficulties. For God the Father,
the heaven of the angels, and the angelic host are far less adapted
to the individualization of a free imagination than are the Homeric
gods, which, in a manner similar to the in part fantastic creations
in Ariosto, in their external mode of appearance, and so far as they
do not epitomize[19] human action, but rather independently confront
each other as individuals, do of themselves suggest the gibe over such
a presentment.[20] Moreover Klopstock, so far as a religious outlook
is concerned, introduces us to a world devoid of foundation, which he
crowds with the brilliant effects of a rather exhausting imagination,
and compels us to take everything as seriously as he means it himself.
This is particularly unfortunate in the case of his angels and devils.
Such creations only really have substance and can be brought home to
us in their individuality in so far as the material of their actions,
as with the Homeric gods, is rooted in the spiritual experience of
humanity, or in a reality already known to us, as in cases where
they claim importance as being the guardian spirits or angels of men
or cities, but who, apart from such a concrete significance, assert
what is just so much the more merely the vacancy of imagination in
proportion as a serious actuality is ascribed to them. Abbadona,
for instance, the repentant devil,[21] possesses neither a truly
allegorical meaning--for in the abstract notion of devil there can be
no inconsistency of guilt which can be converted into virtue--nor is
such a figure one that is essentially and truly concrete. If Abbadona
were a man, a conversion to God would no doubt be reasonable; but
where we have evil regarded as something independently substantive,
which is not an individual human evil, such a conversion is merely
a triviality of sentimental emotion. It is in fact a distinguishing
characteristic of Klopstock's invention that it creates such unreal