The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
are together the knowledge and experience of what is. Stars, animals
and plants are ignorant of their law--it does not come into their
experience; but man only then exists conformably to the principle of
his being when he knows what he is and by what he is surrounded. He
must recognize the powers by which he is driven or influenced; and it
is just such a knowledge which poetry, in its original and vital[2]
form, supplies.
(_b_) It is, however, also a content of the same character which
belongs to man's _ordinary_ conscious life. This too instructs him in
general laws, as such at least are interpreted by the motley crowd of
human life, in their distinction, coordination, and significance. The
question therefore arises, as previously observed, as to the nature of
the distinction between the mode of conception severally adopted by
prose and poetry, a similarity in the content of each being assumed as
possible.
(_α_) Poetry is of greater antiquity than speech modelled in the
artistic form of elaborate prose. It is the _original_ imaginative
grasp of truths a form of knowledge, which fails as yet to separate
the universal from its living existence in the particular object,
which does not as yet contrast law land phenomena, object and means,
or relate the one to the other in subordination to the process of
human reason, but comprehends the one exclusively in the other and by
virtue of the other. For this reason it does not merely, under the mode
of imagery, express a content already essentially apprehended in its
universality; on the contrary it lingers, conformably to its unmediated
notion, in the unity of concrete life itself, which has not as yet
effected such a separation or such an association of mere relationship.
(_αα_) Under the above forms of envisualization, poetry posits all that
it comprehends as an exclusive and consequently independent totality,
which, despite its capacity for a rich content and an extensive range
of condition, individuals, actions, events, emotions and ideas of
every kind, nevertheless is forced to exhibit the same in all their
wide complexity as an essentially self-determined whole, as displayed
and motived by the unity, whose individual expression this or that
fact in its singularity actually is. And consequently the universal
or rational principle is not expressed in poetry in its abstract
universality, or in the complexus which lies open to philosophical
exposition or under the relation of its varied aspects apprehended
by science, but on the contrary as a vital union, in its phenomenal
presence, possessed with soul and self-determined throughout; and it is
further expressed in such a way that the all-embracing unity, the real
soul of its vitality, is only suffered to be operative in mysterious
guise from within outwards.