The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
I have already adverted to the general ground of the necessity of
this conflict. The substance of ethical condition is, when viewed
as concrete unity, a totality of _different_ relations and forces,
which, however, only under the inactive condition of the gods in
their blessedness achieve the works of the Spirit in enjoyment of
an undisturbed life. In contrast to this, however, there is no less
certainly implied in the notion of this totality itself an impulse
to move from its, in the first instance, still abstract ideality,
and transplant itself in the real actuality of the phenomenal world.
On account of the nature of this primitive obsession,[30] it comes
about that mere difference, if conceived on the basis of definite
conditions of individual personalities, must inevitably associate with
contradiction and collision. Only such a view can pretend to deal
seriously with those gods which, though they endure in their tranquil
repose and unity in the Olympus and heaven of imagination and religious
conception, yet, in so far as they are actual,[31] viewed at least as
the energic in the definite pathos of a human personality, participate
in concrete life, all other claims notwithstanding, and, in virtue of
their specific singularity and their mutual opposition, render both
blame and wrong inevitable.
(_γγ_) As a result of this, however, an unmediated contradiction is
posited, which no doubt may assert itself in the Real, but, for all
that, is unable to maintain itself as that which is wholly substantive
and verily real therein; which rather discovers, and only discovers,
its essential justification in the fact that it is able to _annul_
itself as such contradiction. In other words, whatever may be the
claim of the tragic final purpose and personality, whatever may be
the necessity of the tragic collision, it is, as a consequence of our
present view, no less a claim that is asserted--this is our _third_
and last point--by the tragic resolution of this division. It is
through _this_ latter result that Eternal Justice is operative in such
aims and individuals under a mode whereby it restores the ethical
substance and unity in and along with the downfall of the individuality
which disturbs its repose. For, despite the fact that individual
characters propose that which is itself essentially valid, yet they
are only able to carry it out under the tragic demand in a manner that
implies contradiction and with a onesidedness which is injurious.
What, however, is substantive in truth, and the function of which
is to secure realization, is not the battle of particular unities,
however much such a conflict is essentially involved in the notion
of a real world and human action; rather it is the reconciliation in
which definite ends and individuals unite in harmonious action without
mutual violation and contradiction. That which is abrogated in the
tragic issue is merely the _one-sided_ particularity which was unable