The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_β_) In tragedy then that which is eternally substantive is
triumphantly vindicated under the mode of reconciliation. It simply
removes from the contentions of personality the false one-sidedness,
and exhibits instead that which is the object of its volition, namely,
positive reality, no longer under an asserted mediation of opposed
factors, but as the real support of consistency.[34] And in contrast to
this in _comedy_ it is the purely _personal experience_, which retains
the mastery in its character of infinite self-assuredness.[35] And it
is only these two fundamental aspects of human action which occupy a
position of contrast in the classification of dramatic poetry into its
several types. In tragedy individuals are thrown into confusion in
virtue of the abstract nature of their sterling volition and character,
or they are forced to accept that with resignation, to which they have
been themselves essentially opposed. In comedy we have a vision of the
victory of the intrinsically assured stability of the wholly personal
soul-life, the laughter of which resolves everything through the medium
and into the medium of such life.
(_αα_) The general basis of comedy is therefore a world in which
man has made himself, in his conscious activity, complete master of
all that otherwise passes as the essential content of his knowledge
and achievement; a world whose ends are consequently thrown awry on
of their own lack of substance. A democratic folk, with egotistic
citizens, litigious, frivolous, conceited, without faith or knowledge,
always intent on gossip, boasting and vanity--such a folk is past
praying for; it can only dissolve in its folly. But it would be a
mistake to think that any action that is without genuine content is
therefore comic because it is void of substance. People only too
often in this respect confound the merely _ridiculous_ with the true
comic. Every contrast between what is essential and its appearance,
the object and its instrument, may be ridiculous, a contradiction in
virtue of which the appearance is absolutely cancelled, and the end is
stultified in its realization. A profounder significance is, however,
implied in the comic. There is, for instance, nothing comic in human
crime. The satire affords a proof of this, to the point of extreme
aridity, no matter how emphatic may be the colours in which it depicts
the condition of the actual world in its contrast to all that the man
of virtue ought to be. There is nothing in mere folly, stupidity, or
nonsense, which in itself necessarily partakes of the comic, though
we all of us are ready enough to laugh at it. And as a rule it is
extraordinary what a variety of wholly different things excite human
laughter. Matters of the dullest description and in the worst possible
taste will move men in this way; and their laughter may be excited
quite as much by things of the profoundest importance, if only they
happen to notice some entirely unimportant feature, which may conflict