The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
In all these tragic conflicts, however, we must above all place on one
side the false notion of _guilt_ or _innocence_. The heroes of tragedy
are quite as much under one category as the other. If we accept the
idea as valid that a man is guilty only in the case that a choice
lay open to him, and he deliberately decided on the course of action
which he carried out, then these plastic figures of ancient drama
are guiltless. They act in accordance with a specific character, a
specific pathos, for the simple reason that they are this character,
this pathos. In such a case there is no lack of decision and no choice.
The strength of great characters consists precisely in this that they
do not choose, but are entirely and absolutely just that which they
will and achieve. They are simply themselves, and never anything else,
and their greatness consists in that fact. Weakness in action, in
other words, wholly consists in the division of the personal self as
such from its content, so that character, volition and final purpose
do not appear as absolutely one unified growth; and inasmuch as no
assured end lives in the soul as the very substance of the particular
personality, as the pathos and might of the individual's entire will,
he is still able to turn with indecision from this course to that, and
his final decision is that of caprice. A wavering attitude of this
description is alien to these plastic creations. The bond between the
psychological state of mind and the content of the will is for them
indissoluble. That which stirs them to action is just in this very
pathos which implies an ethical justification and which, even in the
pathetic aspects of the dialogue, is not enforced in and through the
merely personal rhetoric of the heart and the sophistry of passion,
but in the equally masculine and cultivated objective presence, in
the profound possibilities, the harmony and vitally plastic beauty of
which Sophocles was to a superlative degree master. At the same time,
however, such a pathos, with its potential resources of collision,
brings in its train deeds that are both injurious and wrongful. They
have no desire to avoid the blame that results therefrom. On the
contrary, it is their fame to have done what they have done. One can in
fact urge nothing more intolerable against a hero of this type than by
saying that he has acted innocently. It is a point of honour with such
great characters that they are guilty. They have no desire to excite
pity or our sensibilities. For it is not the substantive, but rather
the wholly personal deepening[48] of the individual character, which
stirs our individual pain. These securely strong characters, however,
coalesce entirely with their essential pathos, and this indivisible
accord inspires wonder, but does not excite heart emotions. The drama
of Euripides marks the transition to that.