The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
The final result, then, of the development of tragedy conducts us
to this issue and only this, namely, that the twofold vindication
of the mutually conflicting aspects are no doubt retained, but the
_onesided_ mode under which they were maintained is cancelled, and
the undisturbed ideal harmony brings back again that condition of
the chorus, which attributes without reserve equal honour to all
the gods. The true course of dramatic development consists in the
annulment of _contradictions_ viewed as such, in the reconciliation
of the forces of human action, which alternately strive to negate
each other in their conflict. Only so far is misfortune and suffering
not the final issue, but rather the satisfaction of spirit, as for
the first time, in virtue of such a conclusion, the necessity of all
that particular individuals experience, is able to appear in complete
accord with reason, and our emotional attitude is tranquillized on
a true ethical basis, rudely shaken by the calamitous result to the
heroes, but reconciled in the substantial facts. And it is only in so
far as we retain such a view securely that we shall be in a position to
understand ancient tragedy. We have to guard ourselves therefore from
concluding that a _dénouement_ of this type is merely a moral issue
conformably to which evil is punished and virtue rewarded, as indicated
by the proverb that "when crime turns to vomit, virtue sits down at
table." We have nothing to do here with this wholly personal aspect of
a self-reflecting personality and its conception of good and evil, but
are concerned with the appearance of the affirmative reconciliation and
with the equal validity of both the powers engaged in actual conflict,
when the collision actually took place. To as little extent is the
necessity of the issue a blind destiny, or in other words a purely
irrational, unintelligible fate, identified with the classical world
by many; rather it is the rationality of destiny, albeit it does not
as yet appear as self-conscious Providence, the divine final end of
which in conjunction with the world and individuals appears on its own
account and for others, depending as it does on just this fact that the
highest Power paramount over particular gods and mankind cannot suffer
this, namely, that the forces, which affirm their selfsubsistence
in modes that are abstract or incomplete, and thereby overstep the
boundary of their warrant, no less than the conflicts which result
from them, should retain their self-stability. Fate drives personality
back upon its limits, and shatters it, when it has grown overweening.
An irrational compulsion, however, an innocence of suffering would
rather only excite indignation in the soul of the spectator than
ethical tranquillity. From a further point of view, therefore, the
reconciliation of _tragedy_ is equally distinct from that of the
_Epos._ If we look at either Achilles or Odysseus in this respect we