The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_α_) Furthermore, inasmuch as poetry does not accept the universal in
scientific abstraction from its object, but seeks to represent what
is rational under the mode of individuality,[6] the specific traits
of national character are essential to its growth; the content and
the particular mode of its presentation are in fact conditioned by
the nature of these and the general outlook in each case. We find it
consequently adapting itself to every variety of form and peculiarity.
It matters not what the poetry may be, whether Oriental, Italian,
Spanish, English, Roman, Hellenic, or German, each and all differ
totally in their spirit, emotional impulse, general outlook and
expression.
A similar distinctive variety asserts itself in particular epochs as
they are favourable to the art of poetry or the reverse. The results
secured, for example, by our German poetry were impossible in the
Middle Ages, or the times of the thirty years' war. The particular
motives, which in our own day excite the greatest interest, are
inseparable from the entire evolution of contemporary life. And in the
same way every age has its own wider or more restricted, more exalted
and liberal, or more depressed phase of emotional life, in short its
specific outlook on the world, which it is the express aim of poetry
to bring home to the artistic consciousness in the most intelligible
and complete manner, inasmuch as language is the one medium capable of
expressing the human spirit wherever and in whatever form it may be
manifested.
(_β_) Among these national characteristics, or views and opinions
peculiar to particular epochs, some have closer affinity with the
poetic impulse than others. The Oriental consciousness is, for example,
in general more poetic than the Western mind, if we exclude Greece.
In the East the principle predominant is always that of coherence,
solidity, unity, substance. An outlook of this nature is intrinsically
most penetrative, even though it may fail to reach the freedom of the
Ideal. Our Western point of view, especially that of modern life, is
based on the endless breaking up and division of its boundless material
into fragments, in virtue of which process, the extreme emphasis laid
here on particular facts, what is merely finite becomes substantive for
the imagination, and despite of this must be once more subsumed under
the converse action of relativity. For the Oriental nothing persists as
really substantive, but everything appears as contingent, discovering
its supreme focus, stability and final justification in the One, the
Absolute, to which it is referred.