The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_α_) In the _first_ place that which constitutes a homogeneous
content, whether it be a definite object of action and event, or a
specific emotion and passion, must before everything else possess
intrinsic unity.
(_αα_) All else must be posited under relation to this bond of unity,
and thereby combine to form a freehand concrete coherence of all parts.
This is only possible under the condition, that the content selected is
not conceived as abstract _universal_, but as the action and emotion of
men, as the object and passion which are actually present in the mind,
soul, and volition of definite individuals, arising as such from the
distinctive basis of an individual nature in each case.
(_ββ_) The universal, which is to receive representation, and the
individuals, in whose character events and actions the manifestation
of poetry is asserted must not consequently fall into fragments, or be
so related that the individuals are merely of service as an abstract
universal; both aspects must combine in vital coalescence. In the
Iliad, for example, the contest of Greeks and Trojans, and the victory
of the former is inseparably bound up with the wrath of Achilles,
which for this reason becomes the common focus welding all together.
No doubt we also find poetical works in which the fundamental content
is partly more abstract in its generalization, and also partly is
executed in a way that expresses a universal of more significance.
Dante's great epic poem is an illustration, which not only embraces the
world divine throughout, but displays individuals of the most varied
character in their relation to the punishments of hell, purgatory and
the blessedness of Paradise. But even here we find no entirely abstract
separation, of the two points of view, no mere relation of service
between the particular objects. For in the Christian world the focus
of conscious life is not conceived as nothing more than an accident of
Godhead, but as essential and infinite cause or end itself, so that
here the universal purpose, that is the divine justice in condemnation
and salvation can verily appear as immanent fact, the eternal interest
and being of the individual himself. In this divine world the
individual is throughout of pre-eminent importance. In that of the
State he can of course be sacrificed in order to save the universal,
that is the State. In his relation to God, however, and in the kingdom
of God he is essentially and exclusively the end.