The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
The poetical expression adds, however, yet more,
for it associates with the object recognized a vision of the same,
or we should rather say the purely abstract relation of knowledge
vanishes, and the real definition takes its place. In the same way
take the phrase, "Alexander conquered the Persian empire." Here, no
doubt, so far as content is concerned, we have a concrete conception;
the many-sided definition of it, however, expressed here in the word
"victory," is concentrated in a featureless and pure abstraction, which
fails to image before us anything of the appearance and reality of the
exploit accomplished by Alexander. This truth applies to every kind of
similar expression. We recognize the bare fact; but it remains pale and
dun, and from the point of view of individual existence undetermined
and abstract. The poetic conception consequently embraces the fulness
of the objective phenomenon as it essentially exists, and is able to
elaborate the same united with the essential ideality of the fact in a
creative totality.
What follows as a primary result of this is that it is of interest to
the imagination to _linger_ near the external characteristics of the
fact, to the extent at least that it seeks to express the same in its
positive reality, deems this as essentially worthy of contemplation and
insists on this very attitude.
Poetry is consequently in its manner of expression _descriptive_
Description is, however, not the right word for it. We are, in fact,
accustomed to accept as descriptive, and in contrast to the abstract
definition, in which a content is otherwise brought home to our
intelligence, much that the poet passes by, so that from the point
of view of ordinary speech poetic composition can only appear as a
roundabout way and a useless superfluity. The poet must, however,
manage to bring his imagination to bear upon the explication of the
actual phenomenon he is attempting to depict with a vital interest.[2]
In this way, for instance, Homer adds a descriptive epithet to every
hero. So Achilles is the swift-footed, the Achaeans bright-greaved,
Hector as of the glancing helm, Agamemnon the lord of peoples, and so
forth. The name is no doubt descriptive of a personality, but the name
alone brings nothing further to our vision. To have some distinct idea
of this we require further attributes. We have in fact similar epithets
attached by Homer to other objects, which are essential to our vision
of the epic, such as sea, ships, sword and others, epithets which seize
and place before us an essential quality of the particular object,
depicting it more precisely, and which enable us to apprehend the fact
in its concrete appearance.