The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 01 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
3. Words so connected as that they become signs of our thoughts, are
called SPEECH, of which every part is a _name_. But seeing (as is said)
both marks and signs are necessary for the acquiring of philosophy,
(marks by which we may remember our own thoughts, and signs by which we
may make our thoughts known to others), names do both these offices; but
they serve for marks before they be used as signs. For though a man were
alone in the world, they would be useful to him in helping him to
remember; but to teach others, (unless there were some others to be
taught) of no use at all. Again, names, though standing singly by
themselves, are marks, because they serve to recal our own thoughts to
mind; but they cannot be signs, otherwise than by being disposed and
ordered in speech as parts of the same. For example, a man may begin
with a word, whereby the hearer may frame an idea of something in his
mind, which, nevertheless, he cannot conceive to be the idea which was
in the mind of him that spake, but that he would say something which
began with that word, though perhaps not as by itself, but as part of
another word. So that the nature of a name consists principally in this,
that it is a mark taken for memory's sake; but it serves also by
accident to signify and make known to others what we remember ourselves,
and, therefore, I will define it thus:
[Sidenote: Definition of a Name.]
4. _A_ NAME _is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may
raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and
which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought
the speaker had, or had not before in his mind_. And it is for brevity's
sake that I suppose the original of names to be arbitrary, judging it a
thing that may be assumed as unquestionable. For considering that new
names are daily made, and old ones laid aside; that diverse nations use
different names, and how impossible it is either to observe similitude,
or make any comparison betwixt a name and a thing, how can any man
imagine that the names of things were imposed from their natures? For
though some names of living creatures and other things, which our first
parents used, were taught by God himself; yet they were by him
arbitrarily imposed, and afterwards, both at the Tower of Babel, and
since, in process of time, growing everywhere out of use, are quite
forgotten, and in their room have succeeded others, invented and
received by men at pleasure. Moreover, whatsoever the common use of
words be, yet philosophers, who were to teach their knowledge to others,
had always the liberty, and sometimes they both had and will have a
necessity, of taking to themselves such names as they please for the
signifying of their meaning, if they would have it understood. Nor had
mathematicians need to ask leave of any but themselves to name the
figures they invented, _parabolas_, _hyperboles_, _cissoeides_,
_quadratices_, &c. or to call one magnitude A, another B.