9. Secondly, of names, some are _common_ to many things, as a _man_, _a tree_; others _proper_ to one thing, as _he that writ the Iliad_, _Homer_, _this man_, _that man_. And a common name, being the name of many things severally taken, but not collectively of all together (as man is not the name of all mankind, but of every one, as of Peter, John, and the rest severally) is therefore called an _universal name_; and therefore this word _universal_ is never the name of any thing existent in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when _a living creature_, _a stone_, _a spirit_, or any other thing, is said to be _universal_, it is not to be understood, that any man, stone, &c. ever was or can be universal, but only that these words, _living creature_, _stone_, _&c._ are _universal names_, that is, names common to many things; and the conceptions answering them in our mind, are the images and phantasms of several living creatures, or other things. And therefore, for the understanding of the extent of an universal name, we need no other faculty but that of our imagination, by which we remember that such names bring sometimes one thing, sometimes another, into our mind. Also of common names, some are more, some less common. _More common_, is that which is the name of more things; _less common_, the name of fewer things; as _living creature_ is more common than _man_, or _horse_, or _lion_, because it comprehends them all: and therefore a more common name, in respect of a less common, is called the _genus_, or a _general name_; and this in respect of that, the _species_, or a _special name_. [Sidenote: Names of the first and second intention.] 10. And from hence proceeds the third distinction of names, which is, that some are called names of the _first_, others of the _second intention_. Of the _first intention_ are the names of things, a _man_, _stone_, _&c._: of the _second_ are the names of names and speeches, as _universal_, _particular_, _genus_, _species_, _syllogism_, and the like. But it is hard to say why those are called names of the _first_, and these of the _second intention_, unless perhaps it was first intended by us to give names to those things which are of daily use in this life, and afterwards to such things as appertain to science, that is, that our second intention was to give names to names. But whatsoever the cause hereof may be, yet this is manifest, that _genus_, _species_, _definition_, _&c._ are names of words and names only; and therefore to put _genus_ and _species_ for things, and _definition_ for the nature of any thing, as the writers of _metaphysics_ have done, is not right, seeing they be only significations of what we think of the nature of things. [Sidenote: Universal, particular, individual, and indefinite names.]