5. There are many distinctions of propositions, whereof the first is, that some are _universal_, others _particular_, others _indefinite_, and others _singular_; and this is commonly called the distinction of _quantity_. An _universal_ proposition is that whose subject is affected with the sign of an universal name, as _every man is a living creature_. _Particular_, that whose subject is affected with the sign of a particular name, as _some man is learned_. An _indefinite_ proposition has for its subject a common name, and put without any sign, as _man is a living creature_, _man is learned_. And a _singular_ proposition is that whose subject is a singular name, as _Socrates is a philosopher_, _this man is black_. [Sidenote: Affirmative and negative.] 6. The second distinction is into _affirmative_ and _negative_, and is called the distinction of _quality_. An _affirmative_ proposition is that whose predicate is a positive name, as _man is a living creature_. _Negative_, that whose predicate is a negative name, as _man is not a stone_. [Sidenote: True & false.] 7. The third distinction is, that one is _true_, another _false_. A _true_ proposition is that, whose predicate contains, or comprehends its subject, or whose predicate is the name of every thing, of which the subject is the name; as _man is a living creature_ is therefore a true proposition, because whatsoever is called _man_, the same is also called _living creature_; and _some man is sick_, is true, because _sick_ is the name of _some man_. That which is not true, or that whose predicate does not contain its subject, is called a _false_ proposition, as _man is a stone_. Now these words _true_, _truth_, and _true proposition_, are equivalent to one another; for truth consists in speech, and not in the things spoken of; and though _true_ be sometimes opposed to _apparent_ or _feigned_, yet it is always to be referred to the truth of proposition; for the image of a man in a glass, or a ghost, is therefore denied to be a very man, because this proposition, _a ghost is a man_, is not true; for it cannot be denied but that a ghost is a very ghost. And therefore truth or verity is not any affection of the thing, but of the proposition concerning it. As for that which the writers of metaphysics say, that _a thing_, _one thing_, and _a very thing_, are equivalent to one another, it is but trifling and childish; for who does not know, that _a man_, _one man_, and _a very man_, signify the same. [Sidenote: True & false belongs to speech, and not to things.]