9. They err in the seventh manner, that make this distinction between things that have being, that some of them _exist by themselves_, others by _accident_; namely, because _Socrates is a man_ is a necessary proposition, and _Socrates is a musician_ a contingent proposition, therefore they say some things exist necessarily or by themselves, others contingently or by accident; whereby, seeing _necessary_, _contingent_, _by itself_, _by accident_, are not names of things, but of propositions, they that say _any thing that has being, exists by accident_, copulate the name of a proposition with the name of a thing. In the same manner also, they err, which place some ideas in the understanding, others in the fancy; as if from the understanding of this proposition, _man is a living creature_, we had one idea or image of a man derived from sense to the memory, and another to the understanding; wherein that which deceives them is this, that they think one idea should be answerable to a name, another to a proposition, which is false; for proposition signifies only the order of those things one after another, which we observe in the same idea of man; so that this proposition, _man is a living creature_ raises but one idea in us, though in that idea we consider that first, for which he is called man, and next that, for which he is called living creature. The falsities of propositions in all these several manners, is to be discovered by the definitions of the copulated names. [Sidenote: Falsity of propositions detected by resolving the terms with definitions.] 10. But when names of bodies are copulated with names of bodies, names of accidents with names of accidents, names of names with names of names, and names of phantasms, with names of phantasms, if we, nevertheless, remain still doubtful whether such propositions are true, we ought then in the first place to find out the definition of both those names, and again the definitions of such names as are in the former definition, and so proceed by a continual resolution till we come to a simple name, that is, to the most general or most universal name of that kind; and if after all this, the truth or falsity thereof be not evident, we must search it out by philosophy, and ratiocination, beginning from definitions. For every proposition, universally true, is either a definition, or part of a definition, or the evidence of it depends upon definitions. [Sidenote: Of the fault of a syllogism consisting in implication of the terms with the copula.]