not look on them as fellow-subjects, but esteem them for enemies and spies; and that ye rashly admit not for God’s word all which, either openly or privately, they shall pretend to be so. I say more plainly, if any preacher, confessor, or casuist, shall but say that this doctrine is agreeable with God’s word, namely, that the chief ruler, nay, any private man may lawfully be put to death without the chief’s command, or that subjects may resist, conspire, or covenant against the supreme power; that ye by no means believe them, but instantly declare their names. He who approves of these reasons, will also like my intentions in writing this book. Last of all, I have propounded to myself this rule through this whole discourse. First, not to define aught which concerns the justice of single actions, but leave them to be determined by the laws. Next, not to dispute the laws of any government in special, that is, not to point which are the laws of any country, but to declare what the laws of all countries are. Thirdly, not to seem of opinion, that there is a less proportion of obedience due to an _aristocracy_ or _democracy_ than a _monarchy_. For though I have endeavoured, by arguments in my tenth chapter, to gain a belief in men, that monarchy is the most commodious government; which one thing alone I confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably stated; yet every where I expressly say, that in all kind of government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equal power. Fourthly, not in anywise to dispute the positions of divines, except those which strip subjects of their obedience, and shake the foundations of civil government. Lastly, lest I might imprudently set forth somewhat of which there would be no need, what I had thus written I would not presently expose to the public. Wherefore I got some few copies privately dispersed among some of my friends; that discrying the opinions of others, if any things appeared erroneous, hard, or obscure, I might correct, soften and explain them. These things I found most bitterly excepted against. That I had made the civil powers too large; but this by ecclesiastical persons. That I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience; but this by sectaries. That I had set princes above the civil laws; but this by lawyers. Wherefore I was not much moved by these men’s reprehensions, as who in doing this, did but do their own business; except it were to tie those knots somewhat faster.