8. In the last place, it is a great hindrance to civil government, especially monarchical, that men distinguish not enough between a _people_ and a _multitude_. The _people_ is somewhat that is _one_, having _one will_, and to whom _one action_ may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a multitude. The _people_ rules in all governments. For even in _monarchies_ the _people_ commands; for the _people_ wills by the will of _one man_; but the multitude are citizens, that is to say, subjects. In a _democracy_ and _aristocracy_, the citizens are the _multitude_, but the _court_ is the _people_. And in a _monarchy_, the subjects are the _multitude_, and (however it seem a paradox) the king is the _people_. The common sort of men, and others who little consider these truths, do always speak of a _great number_ of men as of the _people_, that is to say, the _city_. They say, that the _city_ hath rebelled against the _king_ (which is impossible), and that the _people_ will and nill what murmuring and discontented subjects would have or would not have; under pretence of the _people_ stirring up the _citizens_ against the _city_, that is to say, the _multitude_ against the _people_. And these are almost all the opinions, wherewith subjects being tainted do easily tumult. And forasmuch as in all manner of government majesty is to be preserved by him or them, who have the supreme authority; the _crimen læsæ majestatis_ naturally cleaves to these opinions. [Sidenote: Too great a tax of money, though never so just and necessary, disposeth men to sedition.]