The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 02 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
1. By what hath hitherto been said, the _duties_ of citizens and
subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the _power_ of
the supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we have as yet said
nothing of the _duties_ of rulers, and how they ought to behave
themselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between
the _right_ and the _exercise_ of supreme authority; for they can be
divided. As for example, when he who hath the _right_, either cannot
or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of
affairs. For kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order
their affairs; sometimes also, though they can do it themselves, yet
they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choice of their
officers and counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where
the _right_ and _exercise_ are severed, there the government of the
commonweal is like the ordinary government of the world; in which
God, the mover of all things, produceth natural effects by the means
of secondary causes. But where he to whom the right of ruling doth
belong, is himself present in all judicatures, consultations, and
public actions, there the administration is such, as if God, beyond
the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto
all matters. We will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly
speak somewhat concerning their _duties_, who exercise authority,
whether by their own or other’s right. Nor is it my purpose to
descend into those things, which being diverse from others, some
princes may do, for this is to be left to the political practices of
each commonweal.
[Sidenote: The safety of the people is the supreme law.]
2. Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence,
_the safety of the people is the supreme law_. For although they who
among men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws
properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to
be chief and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their _duty_ in
all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto
right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But
because dominions were constituted for peace’s sake, and peace was
sought after for safety’s sake; he, who being placed in authority,
shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will
act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws
of nature. Now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which
princes know their _duty_, so doth it also teach them an art how to
procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the citizens is the
power of the city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in
any state.
[Sidenote: It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit
of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.]