12. In the third place we said, that that trouble of mind which riseth from _ambition_, was offensive to public peace. For there are some, who seeming to themselves to be wiser than others, and more sufficient for the managing of affairs than they who at present do govern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their virtue would prove to the commonweal, they show it by harming it. But because ambition and greediness of honours cannot be rooted out of the minds of men, it is not the duty of rulers to endeavour it; but by constant application of rewards and punishments they may so order it, that men may know that the way to honour is not by contempt of the present government, nor by factions and the popular air, but by the contraries. They are good men who observe the decrees, the laws, and rights of their fathers. If with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours, but the factious punished and had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be more ambition to obey than withstand. Notwithstanding, it so happens sometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fierceness, so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered for fear of his power; but as that happens when the rider, so this when the commander is in danger of falling. But we speak here of those whose authority and power is entire. Their duty, I say, it is to cherish obedient subjects, and to depress the factious all they can; nor can the public power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects’ quiet without it. [Sidenote: And to dissolve factions.] 13. But if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious, much more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselves. Now I call a _faction_, a multitude of subjects gathered together either by mutual _contracts_ among themselves, or by the power of some one, without his or their authority who bear the supreme rule. A _faction_, therefore, is as it were a city in a city: for as by an union of men in the state of nature, a city receives its being, so by a new union of subjects there ariseth a _faction_. According to this definition, a multitude of subjects who have bound themselves simply to obey any foreign prince or subject, or have made any pacts or leagues of mutual defence between themselves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme power in the city, is a _faction_. Also favour with the vulgar, if it be so great that by it an army may be raised, except public caution be given either by hostages or some other pledges, contains _faction_ in it. The same may be said of private wealth, if it exceed; because all things obey money. Forasmuch therefore as it is true, that the state of cities among themselves is natural and hostile, those princes who permit factions, do as much as if they received an enemy within their walls: which is contrary to the subjects’ safety, and therefore also against the law of nature.