1. They who less seriously consider the force of words, do sometimes confound _law_ with _counsel_, sometimes with _covenant_, sometimes with _right_. They confound _law_ with _counsel_, who think that it is the duty of monarchs not only to give ear to their _counsellors_, but also to obey them; as though it were in vain to take _counsel_, unless it were also followed. We must fetch the distinction between _counsel_ and _law_, from the difference between _counsel_ and _command_. Now _counsel_ is a _precept_, in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from _the thing itself which is advised_; but _command_ is a _precept_, in which the cause of my obedience depends on _the will of the commander_. For it is not properly said, _thus I will and thus I command_, except the will stand for a reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the thing itself, but by reason of the adviser’s will, the law is not a _counsel_, but a _command_, and is defined thus: _law is the command of that person, whether man or court, whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience_: as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates in respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws. _Law_ and _counsel_ therefore differ many ways. _Law_ belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth; _counsel_ to them who have no power. To follow what is prescribed by _law_, is _duty_; what by _counsel_, is _free-will_. _Counsel_ is directed to his end, that receives it; _law_, to his that gives it. _Counsel_ is given to none but the willing; _law_ even to the unwilling. To conclude, the right of the _counsellor_ is made void by the will of him to whom he gives counsel; the right of the _law-giver_ is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a _law_ imposed. [Sidenote: How it differs from a covenant.]