2. They confound _law_ and _covenant_, who conceive the laws to be nothing else but certain ὁμολογήματα, or forms of living determined by the common consent of men. Among whom is Aristotle, who defines _law_ on this manner; Νόμός ἐστι λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μγνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα: that is to say, _law is a speech, limited according to the common consent of the city, declaring every thing that we ought to do_. Which definition is not simply of _law_, but of the _civil law_. For it is manifest that the _divine laws_ sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the _laws of nature_. For if they had their original from the consent of men, they might also by the same consent be abrogated; but they are unchangeable. But indeed, that is no right definition of a _civil law_. For in that place, a city is taken either for one civil person, having one will; or for a multitude of men, who have each of them the liberty of their private wills. If for one person, those words _common consent_ are ill-placed here; for _one_ person hath no _common consent_. Neither ought he to have said, _declaring_ what was needful to be done, but _commanding_; for what the city declares, it commands its subjects. He therefore by a city understood a multitude of men, declaring by common consent (imagine it a writing confirmed by votes) some certain forms of living. But these are nothing else but some mutual contracts, which oblige not any man (and therefore are no laws) before that a supreme power being constituted, which can compel, have sufficient remedy against the rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Laws therefore, according to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else but naked and weak contracts; which then at length, when there is one who by right doth exercise the supreme power, shall either become _laws_ or _no laws_ at his will and pleasure. Wherefore he confounds _contracts_ with _laws_, which he ought not to have done; for contract is _a promise_, law a _command_. In contracts we say, _I will do this_; in laws, _do this_. Contracts oblige us;[16] laws tie us fast, being obliged. A _contract_ obligeth of _itself_; the _law_ holds the party obliged by virtue of the universal _contract_ of yielding obedience. Therefore in _contract_, it is first determined what is to be done, before we are obliged to do it; but in _law_, we are first obliged to perform, and what is to be done is determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a _civil law_ thus: _a civil law is a speech limited by the will of the city, commanding everything behoveful to be done_. Which is the same with that we have given above, in chap. VI. art. 9: to wit, _that the civil laws are the command of him, whether man or court of men, who is endued with supreme power in the city, concerning the future actions of his subjects_. Footnote 16: