_Contracts oblige us._] _To be obliged_, and _to be tied being obliged_, seems to some men to be one and the same thing; and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none indeed. More clearly therefore, I say thus: that a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his promise sake; but that the law ties him being obliged, that is to say, it compels him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the law. [Sidenote: How it differs from right.] 3. They confound _laws_ with _right_, who continue still to do what is permitted by _divine right_, notwithstanding it be forbidden by _the civil law_. That which is prohibited by the _divine law_, cannot be permitted by the _civil_; neither can that which is commanded by the _divine law_, be prohibited _by the civil_. Notwithstanding, that which is permitted by the _divine right_, that is to say, that which may be done by _divine right_, doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the _civil laws_; for _inferior laws_ may restrain the liberty allowed by the _superior_, although they cannot enlarge them. Now _natural liberty_ is a right not constituted, but allowed by the laws. For the _laws_ being removed, our _liberty_ is absolute. This is first restrained by the _natural_ and _divine laws_; the residue is bounded by the _civil law_; and what remains, may again be restrained by the _constitutions_ of particular towns and societies. There is great difference therefore between _law_ and _right_. For law is _a fetter_, right is _freedom_; and they differ like contraries. [Sidenote: The division of laws into divine and human; and of the divine into natural and positive; and of the natural into those laws of single men, and those of nations.]