16. _Sin_, in its largest signification, comprehends every _deed_, _word_, and _thought_ against right reason. For every man, by reasoning, seeks out the means to the end which he propounds to himself. If therefore he reason right, that is to say, beginning from most evident principles he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary, he will proceed in a most direct way. Otherwise he will go astray, that is to say, he will either _do_, _say_, or _endeavour_ somewhat against his proper end; which when he hath done, he will indeed in reasoning be said to have _erred_, but in action and will to have _sinned_. For _sin_ follows _error_, just as the _will_ doth the _understanding_. And this is the most general acception of the word; under which is contained every _imprudent_ action, whether against the law, as to overthrow another man’s house, or not against the law, as to build his own upon the sand. [Sidenote: The definition of sin.] 17. But when we speak of _the laws_, the word _sin_ is taken in a more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right reason, but that only which is _blameable_; and therefore it is called _malum culpæ_, the evil of fault. But yet if anything be culpable, it is not presently to be termed _a sin_ or _fault_; but only if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what it is to be _blameable with reason_, what _against reason_. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that _good_ which he desires, and _evil_ which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that _good_, which another counts _evil_; and the same man what now he esteemed for _good_, he immediately after looks on as _evil_: and the same thing which he calls _good_ in himself, he terms _evil_ in another. For we all measure _good_ and _evil_ by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies, because they increase their honours, goods, and power; and of equals, by reason of that strife of honours which is among them; both seem and are _irksome_, and therefore _evil_ to all; and men use to repute those _evil_, that is to say, to _lay some fault_ to their charge, from whom they receive _evil_; it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that _theft_, _adultery_, and the like are _sins_; as if they should say that all men account those things _evil_, to which they have given names which are usually taken in an _evil_ sense. But we demand not whether theft be a sin, but what is to be termed theft; and so concerning others, in like manner. Forasmuch therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable is not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another,