The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 02 (of 11) — Thomas Hobbes — John Shaqi
The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 02 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
1. All authors agree not concerning the definition of _the natural
law_, who notwithstanding do very often make use of this term in
their writings. The method therefore wherein we begin from
definitions and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to
them who leave no place for contrary disputes. For the rest, if any
man say that somewhat is done against the law of nature, one proves
it hence; because it was done against the general agreement of all
the most wise and learned nations: but this declares not who shall
be the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations. Another
hence, that it was done against the general consent of all mankind;
which definition is by no means to be admitted. For then it were
impossible for any but children and fools, to offend against such a
law; for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend all men
actually endued with reason. These therefore either do nought
against it, or if they do aught, it is without their own consent,
and therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the laws of nature
from the consents of them who oftener break than observe them, is in
truth unreasonable. Besides, men condemn the same things in others,
which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publicly
commend what they privately condemn; and they deliver their opinions
more by hearsay, than any speculation of their own; and they accord
more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or
some other perturbation of mind, than true reason. And therefore it
comes to pass, that whole bodies of people often do those things
with the greatest unanimity and earnestness, which those writers
most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But
since all do grant, that is done by _right_, which is not done
against reason, we ought to judge those actions only _wrong_, which
are repugnant to right reason, that is, which contradict some
certain truth collected by right reasoning from true principles. But
that which is done _wrong_, we say it is done against some law.
Therefore _true reason_ is a certain _law_; which, since it is no
less a part of human nature, than any other faculty or affection of
the mind, is also termed natural. Therefore the _law of nature_,
that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason,[4] conversant
about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the
constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.
Footnote 4: