3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth article, that there was required to the security of men, not only their consent, but also the subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary to peace and defence; and that in that union and subjection the nature of a city consisted; we must discern now in this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discussed, and stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are contained in the will of the major part, what things are necessary to peace and common defence. But first of all, it is necessary to peace, that a man be so far forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation. But care may be had, there be no just cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others; which if it be not had, no man is supposed to have submitted himself to aught, or to have quitted his right to all things, before that there was a care had of his security. [Sidenote: That a coercive power is necessary for security.] 4. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a city, do covenant with the rest, either by words or writing, _not to steal_, _not to kill_, and to observe the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil. [Sidenote: What the sword of justice is.] 5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this right, _the sword of justice_. But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer. [Sidenote: That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the chief command.]