The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
Secondly, they that have authority concerning the _militia_; to have the
custody of arms, forts, ports; to levy, pay, or conduct soldiers; or to
provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or
sea, are public ministers. But a soldier without command, though he
fight for the commonwealth, does not therefore represent the person of
it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath
command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.
[Sidenote: For instruction of the people.]
They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the
people their duty to the sovereign power, and instruct them in the
knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt
to live in godliness, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the
public enemy, are public ministers: ministers, in that they do it not by
their own authority, but by another’s; and public, because they do it,
or should do it, by no authority but that of the sovereign. The monarch,
or the sovereign assembly only hath immediate authority from God, to
teach and instruct the people; and no man but the sovereign, receiveth
his power _Dei gratiâ_ simply; that is to say, from the favour of none
but God: all other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of
God, and their sovereigns; as in a monarchy _Dei gratiâ et regis_; or
_Dei providentiâ et voluntate regis_.
[Sidenote: For judicature.]
They also to whom jurisdiction is given, are public ministers. For in
their seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign; and
their sentence, is his sentence: for, as hath been before declared, all
judicature is essentially annexed to the sovereignty; and therefore all
other judges are but ministers of him or them that have the sovereign
power. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely of _fact_, and of
_law_; so are judgments, some of fact, some of law: and consequently in
the same controversy, there may be two judges, one of fact, another of
law.