The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts. And first, generally all passions may be expressed _indicatively_; as _I love_, _I fear_, _I joy_, _I deliberate_, _I will_, _I command_: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed _subjunctively_; which is a speech proper to signify suppositions, with their consequences; as, _if this be done, then this will follow_; and differs not from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words; but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. The language of desire, and aversion, is _imperative_; as _do this_, _forbear that_; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is _command_; otherwise _prayer_; or else _counsel_. The language of vain-glory, of indignation, pity and revengefulness, _optative_: but of the desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called _interrogative_; as, _what is it_, _when shall it_, _how is it done_, and _why so?_ other language of the passions I find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signify as speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed. These forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have. [Sidenote: Good and evil apparent.] And because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call _apparent_, or _seeming good_. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is _apparent_, or _seeming evil_: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others. [Sidenote: Felicity.]