Titles of _honour_, such as are duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the sovereign power of the commonwealth: which titles, were in old time titles of office, and command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French: dukes, in Latin _duces_, being generals in war: counts, _comites_, such as bear the general company out of friendship, and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: marquises, _marchiones_, were counts that governed the marches, or bounds of the empire. Which titles of duke, count, and marquis, came into the empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German _militia_. But baron, seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and signifies a great man; such as were the king’s, or prince’s men, whom they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from _vir_, to _ber_, and _bar_, that signified the same in the language of the Gauls, that _vir_ in Latin; and thence to _bero_, and _baro_: so that such men were called _berones_, and after _barones_; and, in Spanish, _varones_. But he that would know more particularly the original of titles of honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Selden’s most excellent treatise of that subject. In process of time these offices of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into mere titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the commonwealth: and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other titles also, were devised to the same end. [Sidenote: Worthiness.] WORTHINESS, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert, and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: [Sidenote: Fitness.] which particular ability, is usually named FITNESS, or _aptitude_. For he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and worthiest of riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may nevertheless be a worthy man, and valuable for something else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment, that nevertheless, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For merit presupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of contracts. ------- CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS. [Sidenote: What is here meant by manners.]