7. The third opinion, _that the sovereign power may be divided_, is no less an error than the former, as hath been proved, Part II. chapter I. sect. 15. And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the rights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib. II. chap. I. _De Republica_, that they are not rightly to be called commonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths. For if one part should have power to make the laws for all, they would by their laws at their pleasure, forbid others, to make peace or war, to levy taxes, or to yield fealty and homage without their leave; and they that had the right to make peace and war, and command the _militia_, would forbid the making of other laws, than what themselves liked. And though monarchies stand long, wherein the right of sovereignty hath seemed so divided, because monarchy of itself is a durable kind of government, yet monarchs have been thereby divers times thrust out of their possession. But the truth is, that the right of sovereignty is such, as he or they that have it, cannot, though they would, give away any part thereof, and retain the rest. As for example; if we should suppose the people of Rome to have had the absolute sovereignty of the Roman state, and to have chosen them a council by the name of the senate, and that to this senate they had given the supreme power of making laws, reserving nevertheless to themselves, in direct and express terms, the whole right and title of the sovereignty; which may easily happen amongst them that see not the inseparable connexion between the sovereign power, and the power of making laws: I say, this grant of the people to the senate is of no effect, and the power of making laws is in the people still. For the senate understanding it to be the will and intention of the people, to retain the sovereignty, ought not to take that for granted, which was contradictory thereto, and passed by error. For (_Human Nature_, chap. XIII. sect. 9) in contradictory promises, that which is directly promised, is preferred before that which is opposite thereunto by consequence; because the consequence of a thing is not always obscured, as is the thing itself. The error concerning mixed government hath proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word _body politic_, and how it signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men. And though in the chapters of subordinate corporations, a corporation being declared to be one person in law, yet the same hath not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics, observed any such union. [Sidenote: The fourth, that subjects have a propriety distinct from the dominion of the sovereign, confuted.]