8. The fourth opinion, to wit, that subjects have their _meum_, _tuum_, and _suum_, in property, not only by virtue of the sovereign power over them all, distinct from one another, but also against the sovereign himself, by which they would pretend to contribute nothing to the public, but what they please, hath been already confuted, by proving the absoluteness of the sovereignty, and more particularly, Part II. chapter V. sect. 2; and ariseth from this, that they understand not ordinarily that before the institution of sovereign power, _meum_ and _tuum_, implied no propriety, but a community, where every man had right to every thing, and was in state of war with every man. [Sidenote: The fifth, that the people is a person distinct from the sovereign, confuted.] 9. The fifth opinion, _That the people is a distinct body from him or them that have the sovereignty over them_, is an error already confuted, Part II. chap. II. sect 11, where it is showed, that when men say, _the people rebelleth_, it is to be understood of those particular persons only, and not of the whole nation. And when the people claimeth any thing otherwise than by the voice of the sovereign power, it is not the claim of the people, but only of those particular men, that claim in their own persons; and this error ariseth from the equivocation of the word _people_. [Sidenote: The sixth, that tyrannicide is lawful, confuted.] 10. Lastly, for the opinion, _that tyrannicide is lawful_, meaning by a tyrant any man in whom resideth the right of sovereignty, is no less false and pernicious to human society, than frequent in the writings of those moral philosophers, Seneca and others, so greatly esteemed amongst us. For when a man hath the right of sovereignty, he cannot justly be punished, as hath been often showed already, and therefore much less deposed, or put to death. And howsoever he might deserve punishment, yet punishment is unjust without judgment preceding, and judgment unjust without power of judicature, which a subject hath not over a sovereign. But this doctrine proceedeth from the Schools of Greece, and from those that writ in the Roman state, in which not only the name of a tyrant, but of a king, was hateful. [Sidenote: Four heads of hope of success in rebellion.] 11. Besides _discontent_, to the disposing of a man to rebellion, and pretence, there is required, in the third place, _hope of success_, which consisteth in four points: I. That the discontented have mutual intelligence; II. That they have sufficient number; III. That they have arms; IV. That they agree upon a head. For these four must concur to the making of one body of rebellion, in which intelligence is the life, number the limbs, arms the strength, and a head the unity, by which they are directed to one and the same action. [Sidenote: Two things necessary to an author of rebellion, much eloquence, and little wisdom.]