12. The authors of rebellion, that is, the men that breed these dispositions to rebel in others, of necessity must have in them these three qualities: I. To be discontented themselves; II. To be men of mean judgment and capacity; and, III. To be eloquent men, or good orators. And as for their discontent, from whence it may proceed, hath been already declared. And for the second and third, I am to show now, first, how they may stand together; for it seemeth a contradiction, to place small judgment and great eloquence, or, as they call it, powerful speaking, in the same man: and then in what manner they concur, to dispose other men to sedition. [Sidenote: That the authors of rebellion necessarily, are to be men of little wisdom.] 13. It was noted by Sallust, that in Catiline, who was author of the greatest sedition that ever was in Rome, there was _Eloquentiæ satis, sapientiæ parum_; _eloquence sufficient_, but _little wisdom_. And perhaps this was said of Catiline, as he was Catiline: but it was true of him as an author of sedition. For the conjunction of these two qualities made him not Catiline, but seditious. And that it may be understood, how want of _wisdom_, and store of _eloquence_, may stand together, we are to consider, what it is we call wisdom, and what eloquence. And therefore I shall here again remember some things, that have been said already, _Human Nature_, chap. V. VI. It is manifest that wisdom consisteth in knowledge. Now of knowledge there are two kinds; whereof the one is the remembrance of such things, as we have conceived by our senses, and of the order in which they follow one another. And this _knowledge_ is called _experience_; and the wisdom that proceedeth from it, is that ability to conjecture by the present, of what is past, and to come, which men call _prudence_. This being so, it is manifest presently, that the author of sedition, whosoever he be, must not be prudent. For if he consider and take his experiences aright, concerning the success which they have had, who have been the movers and authors of sedition, either in this or any other state, he shall find, that for one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour, twenty have come to a reproachful end. The other kind of knowledge, is the remembrance of the names or appellations of things, and how every thing is called, which is, in matters of common conversation, a remembrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst themselves, concerning how to be understood of one another. And this kind of knowledge is generally called science, and the conclusions thereof truth. But when men remember not how things are named, by general agreement, but either mistake and misname things, or name them aright by chance, they are not said to have science, but opinion, and the conclusions thence proceeding, are uncertain, and for the most part erroneous. Now that science in particular, from which