The first is, that _election_ is opposite not only to _coaction_ or _compulsion_, but also _necessitation_ or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it; and to those brought formerly, I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either; for when a man is compelled, for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left him, and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether he will be hauled and trained on the ground, or make use of his own feet: likewise when there is no _compulsion_, but the strength of _temptation_ to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to _abstain_, it necessarily determines him to the doing of it; yet he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he _electeth_ which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge _necessity_; but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not _causes_ but _liberty_ that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooses it; but they might as well say, fire doth not burn, because it burns of necessity. The second argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be said that _voluntary_ actions are _necessitated_, and in what sense not. And therefore his Lordship allegeth, as from the authority of the _Schools_, and that which rippeth up the bottom of the _question_, that there is a double act of the _will_. The one, he says, is _actus imperatus_, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferior faculty of the soul; as to open or shut one’s eyes; and this act may be compelled: the other, he says, is _actus elicitus_, an act allured or drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to _will_, to _choose_, to _elect_; this he says cannot be compelled. Wherein, letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question, you may observe, first, that to compel a _voluntary_ act, is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action; and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes: so that _actus imperatus_, here, might as easily have been said in English a _voluntary action_, but that they that invented the term, understood not anything it signified.