Secondly, you may observe, that _actus elicitus_, is exemplified by these words, to _will_, to _elect_, to _choose_, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a man’s soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so is it also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his Lordship’s distinction is, that a _voluntary_ act may be done by _compulsion_, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by _allurement_, or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as _necessarily_ as foul means and threatening; it follows, that to _will_ may be made as _necessary_ as anything that is done by _compulsion_. So that distinction of _actus imperatus_ and _actus elicitus_ are but words, and of no effect against necessity. His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opinion of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first he saith, the _astrologer_ deriveth his _necessity_ from the _stars_; secondly, that the _physician_ attributeth it to the _temper_ of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is _in rerum naturâ_, which because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place. Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, _external objects_ presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make their actions _necessary_; and says, the power such objections have over us, proceeds from our own fault: but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.