First I conceive, that when it cometh into a man’s mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to _deliberate_, the doing it or abstaining _necessarily_ follow the _present_ thought he hath of the _good_ or _evil_ consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden _anger_, the _action_ shall follow the thought of _revenge_; in sudden _fear_, the thought of _escape_. Also when a man hath time to _deliberate_, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the _action_ follows his opinion of the _goodness_ or _harm_ of it. These actions I call VOLUNTARY, my Lord, if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them _voluntary_, because those _actions_ that follow immediately the _last_ appetite, are _voluntary_, and here where is one only appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a _rash_ action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were _voluntary_. For no _action_ of a man can be said to be without _deliberation_, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to _deliberate_ all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of _anger_, shall nevertheless be justly put to _death_, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual _deliberation_, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from _election_. Secondly, I conceive when a man _deliberates_ whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to _consider_ an action, is to imagine the _consequences_ of it, both _good_ and _evil_. From whence is to be inferred, that _deliberation_ is nothing else but _alternate_ imagination of the _good_ and _evil_ sequels of an _action_, or, which is the same thing, alternate _hope_ and _fear_, or alternate _appetite_ to do or quit the action of which he _deliberateth_. Thirdly, I conceive that in all _deliberations_, that is to say, in all alternate _succession_ of contrary _appetites_, the last is that which we call the WILL, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other _appetites_ to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called _intentions_ and _inclinations_, but not _wills_, there being but one _will_, which also in this case may be called the _last will_, though the _intentions_ change often.